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A B S T R A C T   
Human attention is subject to fluctuations. Mind-wandering (MW) – attending to thoughts unrelated to the 
current task demands – is considered a ubiquitous experience. According to the Control Failure x Concerns view 
(McVay & Kane, 2010), MW is curbed by executive control, and task-irrelevant thoughts enter consciousness due 
to attentional control lapses. The generation of off-task thoughts is assumed to increase with higher number of 
personal concerns. Challenging this view, older adults report less MW than younger adults. Here, we addressed 
the hypothesis that older adults report less MW due to a lower ability to notice attention lapses and to appraise 
their current on-task focus. In an age-comparative study (N = 40 younger and N = 44 older adults) using a 
battery of three tasks spanning working memory, reading comprehension, and sustained attention, we assessed 
the correlation between the degree of self-reported on-task focus and task performance on a trial-by-trial basis. 
Younger and older adults' degree of on-task attention measured through thought probes was correlated equally 
strongly with performance across trials in all tasks, indicating preserved ability to monitor attentional fluc-
tuations in healthy aging. Self-reported current concerns' number and importance did not differ across age, and 
they did not predict self-reported attention across tasks. Our study shows that lower rates of MW in aging do not 
reflect lower validity of older adults' attentional appraisal or lower levels of current concerns.   
1. Introduction 
Mind-wandering (MW) is defined as engaging in thoughts unrelated to 
the current demands of the external environment (Schooler et al., 2011). 
For example, whilst reading this introduction, the reader's attention may 
drift towards their upcoming vacation or be captured by a concept of 
personal interest mentioned in the text, leading them to embark on a new 
train of thought. Because these cognitions are unrelated to the task at hand 
(namely, reading and comprehending the text), they are considered as an 
instance of MW. MW is usually assessed via self-report using either ex-
perimenter-scheduled thought probes (referred to as probe-caught MW), 
participant-initiated self-report (referred to as self-caught MW), or with a 
combination of both (Schooler et al., 2011). MW is a frequent human 
experience; earlier research reported ca. 50% rates of MW (Killingsworth 
& Gilbert, 2010; but see Seli et al. (2018) for an alternative view). 
The aim of the present research is to address a puzzle in the MW lit-
erature: According to one prominent theory, the Control Failure x Concerns 
view (McVay & Kane, 2009, 2012a), MW is a failure of attention control. 
Older adults are often assumed to have impaired attention control relative 
to young adults (Braver & West, 2008; Hasher & Zacks, 1988). Yet, older 
adults report less MW than younger adults (Frank, Nara, Zavagnin, Touron, 
& Kane, 2015; Jackson & Balota, 2012; Jordão, Ferreira-Santos, Pinho, & St. 
Jacques, 2019; Krawietz, Tamplin, & Radvansky, 2012; Maillet et al., 2018;  
McVay, Meier, Touron, & Kane, 2013; Seli, Maillet, Smilek, Oakman, & 
Schacter, 2017; Zavagnin, Borella, & De Beni, 2014). This raises the concern 
whether older adults' MW reports are valid due to possible age-related de-
cline in metacognitive ability (Einstein & Mcdaniel, 1997; Jackson & Balota, 
2012; McVay et al., 2013; Zavagnin et al., 2014). Accordingly, the main 
goal of the present study was to investigate the validity of older compared to 
younger adults' MW reports. We next introduce the Control Failure x Con-
cerns view (McVay & Kane, 2009, 2012a) in more detail, and review the 
literature on mind-wandering and age differences therein. Then, we will 
introduce our research questions and experimental design. 
1.1. MW as control failure 
According to the Control Failure x Concerns view, MW is a failure of 
executive control to uphold the task goal (McVay & Kane, 2009, 2012a). 
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Executive control (also known as attention control or executive atten-
tion) is a set of cognitive functions responsible for supervising and con-
trolling thoughts and actions in the service of achieving current goals 
(Logan, 1985). In the Control Failure x Concerns view, executive control 
upholds the current task goal, thereby preventing task-irrelevant 
thoughts from entering consciousness (McVay & Kane, 2010). Task-ir-
relevant thoughts are assumed to be generated continuously outside of 
conscious awareness, and to enter consciousness when executive control 
lapses (McVay & Kane, 2010). Thought generation may increase, for 
instance, when environmental cues activate representations of personally 
relevant goals, namely current concerns (Klinger, 1971, 2009). The extent 
to which the environment (e.g., the lab setting of a psychology study) can 
trigger the person's current concerns may influence the amount of 
thoughts that are generated and that press forward to enter conscious-
ness, thereby increasing MW rates (McVay et al., 2013). 
If MW is a byproduct of failing to control attention, then its oc-
currence should correlate negatively with performance in cognitive 
tasks that require focused attention on the task goal, and on goal-re-
levant information. Support for this assumption comes from inter-in-
dividual correlation studies with younger adults, using both laboratory- 
based and experience sampling methods to assess MW frequency (Kane 
et al., 2007, 2016; McVay & Kane, 2009; McVay & Kane, 2012b, McVay 
& Kane, 2012a; Robison & Unsworth, 2015, 2017, 2018; Unsworth & 
McMillan, 2013, Unsworth & McMillan, 2014a, 2014b; Unsworth & 
Robison, 2017). Of note, some authors found the opposite relationship 
between MW and working memory capacity in younger adults when 
MW was probed in tasks with low attention demands (Levinson, 
Smallwood, & Davidson, 2012; Rummel & Boywitt, 2014). This finding 
in itself, however, does not challenge the view of MW as control failure, 
because with a low demanding task, MW may reflect a voluntary dis-
engagement from the task that does not produce performance costs. 
The link between MW and executive control can also be investigated 
on the intra-individual level by assessing the covariance between fluc-
tuations in attentional reports and task-performance over time. Task 
performance is lower during time intervals when people report MW 
compared to when they report being task-focused. This has been observed 
in a variety of tasks, for example, reading comprehension (Frank et al., 
2015; Jackson & Balota, 2012; Krawietz et al., 2012), the Sustained At-
tention to Response Task (SART) (Kane et al., 2007; McVay et al., 2013;  
McVay & Kane, 2012a), and visual working memory (Adam & Vogel, 
2017; Krimsky, Forster, Llabre, & Jha, 2017; Unsworth & Robison, 2016). 
1.2. MW and current concerns 
The second component of McVay and Kane's (2010) account of MW 
are current concerns. The concerns represent the person's current life 
goals, and concern-related thoughts arise when cued by the environment 
(Klinger, 1971, 2009). Specifically, current concerns are defined as “the 
state of an organism between two points in time: the point at which the or-
ganism becomes committed to pursuing a particular goal and the point at 
which it either consummates or disengages from the goal” (Klinger, Barta, & 
Maxeiner, 1980, p.1223). According to this definition, engagement in an 
experimental task is also a person's current goal, which coexists with any 
other goals a person may entertain. Importantly, the Control Failure x 
Concerns view argues that resulting MW is an interaction of control 
failure and the extent to which the environment cues a persons' current 
concerns, proposing that older adults' reduced MW is a consequence of 
laboratory setting not overlapping with concerns of this age group 
(McVay et al., 2013, pp. 145, 146). There is some experimental evidence 
that priming personal concerns moderately increases peoples' MW rates. 
For example, McVay and Kane (2013) collected keywords of participants' 
current concerns in a pre-study session and embedded these in a SART 
with word stimuli. When probed after personal goal-related keywords, 
participants' MW rates were 4% higher than for probes succeeding the 
presentation of other peoples' keywords, suggesting that current concerns 
play a role in mind-wandering. However, a large experience sampling 
study found that also in the context of daily life older adults report less 
MW than the younger group (Maillet et al., 2018). Therefore, it is un-
likely that the lab environment failing to cue older adults' concerns is 
responsible for their reduced MW rates. One possibility is that older 
adults have fewer concerns/goals than their younger counterparts, as 
older age is associated with fewer normative life events – biological, 
psychological and social life transitions that are highly correlated with 
chronological age (Cavanaugh & Blanchard-Fields, 2018), as well as with 
preference for different goals and higher selectivity of these (Carstensen, 
1993, 1995). For example, Parks, Klinger, and Perlmutter (1989) ad-
ministered a concerns questionnaire and found that older adults' mean 
number of concerns was lower than that of younger adults'. To our 
knowledge, no further MW studies to date have quantified current con-
cerns across age groups. Accordingly, our second goal was to survey the 
current concerns of our participants to assess for potential age differences 
and their relationship with MW propensity. 
1.3. Executive control and MW in aging 
Executive control is assumed to decline with aging (Braver & West, 
2008; Hasher & Zacks, 1988). Recent meta-analyses have shown that, 
instead of a uniform decline, some facets of executive control are im-
paired in the course of aging – for example, the ability to divide attention 
(Verhaeghen, 2011), whereas other facets, such as some varieties of in-
hibition, are preserved (Rey-Mermet & Gade, 2018). Working memory 
capacity – interpreted in the Control Failure x Concerns view as an in-
dicator of executive control – is severely reduced in older compared to 
younger adults (Brockmole & Logie, 2013), leading to the prediction that 
older adults should experience more MW than younger adults. However, 
studies show that older adults consistently report less MW than younger 
adults both in laboratory-based studies (Frank et al., 2015; Jackson & 
Balota, 2012; Krawietz et al., 2012; McVay et al., 2013; Seli et al., 2017;  
Zavagnin et al., 2014) as well as in experience sampling in daily life 
(Maillet et al., 2018). On the assumption that executive control is com-
promised in older age, the findings of less MW reports in older adults 
challenge the Control Failure x Concerns view (McVay et al., 2013). 
Given the inconsistency between MW reports and executive control 
performance in older adults, researchers have started to question 
whether older adults are able to notice and report instances of MW as 
well as younger adults (Einstein & Mcdaniel, 1997; Jackson & Balota, 
2012;McVay et al., 2013; Zavagnin et al., 2014). The ability to monitor 
one's own thoughts is investigated in the field of meta-cognition. Stu-
dies in this field indicate that people are sometimes unable to introspect 
on their cognitive processes (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) or mental ex-
perience (Schooler, 2002), which may constrain the validity of self- 
reports of MW. Furthermore, this ability may also vary over time within 
the same individual. For example, Seli, Jonker, Cheyne, Cortes, and 
Smilek (2015) addressed the question of MW report validity in a sample 
of younger adults. Participants responded to dichotomous attention 
probes (asking whether the person was “on-task” vs. MW), as well as 
indicated how confident they were in their reports' accuracy. Most of 
the time, participants expressed high confidence in their attention re-
ports, and high-confidence attention reports predicted reaction time 
variability in the main task. But when accompanied by low confidence 
ratings, attention reports were not correlated with objective perfor-
mance. These findings demonstrate that, at least in younger adults, the 
ability to appraise one's attention varies from time to time, and re-
ductions in this ability yield reductions in the predictive value of MW 
reports (Seli et al., 2015). Therefore, if older adults have an impaired 
ability to monitor and report their attentional states, that could explain 
why their MW reports appear to dissociate from their task performance. 
One investigation of the validity of older adults' MW self-reports has 
been conducted with eye-tracking (Frank et al., 2015). The authors as-
sessed the relation between objective measures (reading comprehension 
score and oculomotor behavior) and self-reported attention focus in 
younger and older adults. Attention probes had eight response options, 
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reflecting the categories of on-task focus, task-related interference (e.g., 
worry about one's performance on the task), and MW. Compared to 
younger adults, older adults reported less MW but higher rates of task- 
related interference, a pattern that replicates previous studies (McVay 
et al., 2013; Zavagnin et al., 2014). Overall, older adults reported more on- 
task focus than younger adults. Critically, on-task reports predicted higher 
comprehension test scores in both age groups, implying equal validity of 
MW reports across age. However, interactions of thought report category 
and age group were found for several eye-tracking measures. Specifically, 
three eye-tracking measures indicated disrupted processing when older 
adults reported MW. For younger adults, by contrast, the eye-tracking 
measures of disruptions in processing went along with task-related inter-
ference rather than MW reports. Frank et al. (2015) proposed that younger 
and older adults may have different thresholds for classifying thoughts as 
MW or interference. This assumption poses a challenge for the use of ca-
tegorical thought report format in MW studies across age. It is possible that 
older adults report less MW simply because they use a more conservative 
criterion for declaring an attentional state as MW. 
1.4. Concerns about the measurement of MW 
A recent concern in the literature pertains to the diversity of oper-
ationalizing the MW construct, expressing concern for the compar-
ability of results (Seli et al., 2018), as well as the heterogeneity in the 
types of MW probes across studies. These concerns motivated efforts to 
evaluate the validity of MW self-reports (Frank et al., 2015; Schubert, 
Frischkorn, & Rummel, 2019; Weinstein, 2017; Weinstein, De Lima, & 
van der Zee, 2017; Wiemers & Redick, 2019). For example, Weinstein 
et al. (2017) found that probe question wording emphasizing mind- 
wandering produced higher reported MW rates than when the probes 
inquired whether the participants were on-task. However, in another 
study, the manipulation of probe framing yielded comparable rates of 
reported MW (Schubert et al., 2019). 
A further concern in the MW literature is that attention can be on task 
to a different degree at a given time. Seli et al. (2018) presented two 
groups of participants either a dichotomous probe (i.e., “on-task” vs “off- 
task”), or a five-point Likert scale with the following options: “(1) com-
pletely on-task, (2) mostly on-task, (3) both focused on-task and on 
something else, (4) mostly focused on something other than the task, and 
(5) completely focused on something other than the task”. The dichot-
omous condition yielded an average MW rate of 40%. The 5-point-scale 
condition yielded varying MW rates, depending on which rating levels 
were coded as on-task (e.g., whether only “fully on-task” or also “mostly 
on-task” were included in the “task-focus” category). Importantly, MW 
rates in the 5-point rating analyses were always lower than in the di-
chotomous condition, except when only the “fully on-task” responses 
were contrasted with the four remaining response options. Thus, cate-
gorical and especially dichotomous assessment might result in inflated 
MW rate estimates (Mrazek et al., 2012; Seli, et al., 2018). This research 
highlights the issue that attention focus may often be a mix, or a rapid 
succession, of on- and off-task thoughts, and hence more adequately re-
ported on a continuous scale. Additionally, the continuous-scale response 
format circumvents the possibility of age differences in the interpretation 
of, or attitudes towards, verbally defined thought categories of “mind- 
wandering” or “on-task”. If the lower rate of reported MW in older adults 
arises from a more conservative criterion for classifying an attentional 
state as “mind-wandering”, then using a continuous response scale re-
moving the need for such a criterion should abolish that phenomenon: 
Older adults should no longer report stronger on-task focus than younger 
adults. Accordingly, one goal of the present study was to further evaluate 
the validity of MW reports in aging using a continuous attention scale. 
1.5. The present study 
Our main aim was to assess the relationship between attention re-
ports and objective task performance measures in younger and older 
adults. At several times during three cognitive tasks, participants re-
ported their degree of attentiveness to the task on a continuous rating 
scale ranging from one (completely off-task) to nine (completely on- 
task). This response format has been used with younger adults and is 
appropriate for registering small attention fluctuations that have a 
measurable effect on performance (Adam & Vogel, 2017; Unsworth & 
McMillan, 2014a). We chose this rating scale for two reasons. First, ca-
tegorical, dichotomous report modes may pose difficulties for the as-
sessment of MW report validity across age due to possible differences 
between age groups in how to classify a thought as MW (see Frank et al., 
2015). Second, the continuous attention scale allows us to detect small 
fluctuations in attentional state which may go undetected in categorical 
response modes but result in performance disruptions on a trial-by-trial 
basis. A disadvantage of this scale is its inability to assess the contents of 
off-task cognitions. Some studies have indicated that some off-task con-
tents, such as task-related interference, are higher in older adults com-
pared to younger adults (Frank et al., 2015; McVay et al., 2013). These 
studies show, nevertheless, that inclusion of the task-related-interference 
option does not change the fact that older adults report more on-task 
thoughts than younger adults. Therefore, we believe that ignoring the 
nuances between different types of off-task reports does not compromise 
our ability to answer our main question, namely whether older adults are 
able to detect and report fluctuations on their attentional state. 
We assessed the relationship between attention reports and perfor-
mance in three tasks, implementing two widely used tasks in MW re-
search, namely a reading task and the SART (Robertson, Manly, Andrade, 
Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997). Additionally, we tested participants on a full- 
report visual working memory task, which showed high sensitivity to in- 
the-moment attention fluctuations on performance accuracy (Adam & 
Vogel, 2017). Lastly, we collected participants' current concerns by the 
means of a paper-and-pencil survey, using a modified version of the 
questionnaire from Parks et al. (1989) study, and tested for age differ-
ences in concerns, and an effect of the amount of concerns on mean 
reported attention. We were interested to (a) replicate the age difference 
in the number of current concerns reported by Parks et al. (1989), and 
(b) explore the relationship of concerns and self-reported attention. 
Our predictions were as follows. First, we expect to replicate the 
within-person covariation between fluctuations in task performance 
and fluctuations in attention self-reports previously observed in 
younger adults (Adam & Vogel, 2017; Krimsky et al., 2017). Specifi-
cally, we expect that, as younger adults' self-reported attention in-
creases, task errors will decrease as illustrated in all panels of Fig. 1. 
Second, our main interest was to assess how older adults' self-reports 
compare to those of younger adults'. 
A first possibility is that the relationship of older adults' self-reports 
with their performance can be described with the same intercept and 
slope as in younger adults, leading to an overlap in both age groups' 
regression lines, as illustrated in Fig. 1A. Alternatively, the intercept of 
older adults' reports could be shifted upwards relative to younger adults', 
whereas their task accuracy isn't. Then, at the same level of rated at-
tention, older adults would commit more errors than their younger 
counterparts (Fig. 1B). Nevertheless, in the scenario in Fig. 1B attention 
reports are equally valid in both age groups, as the ratings covary with 
within-person fluctuation of performance. Lastly, if older adults' reports 
are not valid, their attentional reports will be uncorrelated (or less cor-
related) with performance, as depicted in Fig. 1C, resulting in an inter-
action between age and attention rating in predicting performance. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Sample size and participants 
Our sample size was planned to match previous studies assessing 
attention report validity (Frank et al., 2015,) N = 36 younger, N = 40 
older adults) and current concerns (Parks et al., 1989,) N = 42 
younger, N = 42 older adults) across age. 
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We tested 40 younger adults between 20 and 33 years (MAge = 24.6, 
SD = 3.6, 33 women) and 44 community-dwelling older adults be-
tween 62 and 79 years (MAge = 69.8, SD = 3.9, 22 women). All par-
ticipants reported normal color vision and normal or corrected-to- 
normal visual acuity, and Swiss German or German as their mother 
tongue. Younger adults were students at a Swiss university or held a 
diploma comparable to a Swiss high-school certificate (Matura). There 
was no minimum education level requirement for older adults. Older 
adults completed the Mini-Mental State Examination (Folstein, Robins, 
& Helzer, 1983) and all obtained a score  >  26. Two older adults 
elected not to attempt the visual working memory task because of 
difficulty. All collected data were included in the analyses. 
Participants were compensated with either 15 Swiss Francs per hour 
or course credit (students only). Written informed consent was obtained 
from all participants prior to the start of the experiment, and partici-
pants were debriefed regarding the purpose of the study at the end. The 
study protocol is in line with the ethical guidelines of the institutional 
review board as established by the completion of a self-assessment 
checklist prior to the start of the study (checklist can be found here 
https://www.phil.uzh.ch/de/forschung/ethik.html). 
2.2. Apparatus and stimuli 
All tasks were programmed in MATLAB (The MathWorks, Natick, MA) 
using the Psychophysics Toolbox 3 (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). All tasks 
presented attention probes at quasi-randomized intervals, according to a 
schedule equal for all participants. An attention probe consisted of a ques-
tion: “How attentive were you just now?” atop of a slider scale. On the left, 
the scale was anchored at: “1 = Not at all on task”, and on the right, at “9 
= Fully on task”. Below the scale, an integer digit (from 1 to 9) was shown 
as soon as participants moved the mouse on the scale and changed ac-
cording to the position of the mouse. Fig. 2 visualizes the attention probes 
(panel E) and the flows of events in the tasks (panels A-D). 
2.2.1. Visual working memory task 
Participants memorized the colors of a set of squares and at the end of 
a brief interval, they reported the color of each square by selecting it from 
a color checkerboard (Adam & Vogel, 2017). The memoranda were pre-
sented against a uniform grey background (RGB 128 128 128). The 
memory squares (side = 90 pixels) appeared in a subset of locations 
selected from an invisible 6 × 6 grid centered in the middle of the screen. 
The colors of the memoranda were sampled without replacement 
from nine values (RGB): white (255 255 255), black (0 0 0), blue (0 0 
255), cyan (0 255 255), green (0 255 0), yellow (255 255 0), 255 25 255 
orange (255 128 0), red (255 0 0), and magenta (255 0 255). The item 
constellations were created with the following constraints. First, the 
memoranda locations within the array were separated by at least one 
grid cell. Second, each memory array in the experiment differed from all 
other arrays in at least two items (i.e., color-location assignments). 
A trial started with a white fixation cross (size: 40 pixels) in the 
center of the screen (see Fig. 2A for timing of events). Next, positions of 
the items for the following trial were outlined in dark grey (RGB 112 112 
112) against the grey background (placeholders). Then, the memoranda 
were presented simultaneously. Younger adults viewed five colors. In an 
attempt to equate the task difficulty across age groups, older adults were 
presented four colors1. During retention, the placeholders remained 
onscreen. At recall, a 3 × 3 color checkerboard (checkerboard side = 90 
pixels), consisting of the nine colors listed above, appeared at the place of 
the to-be-recalled item. All items were tested sequentially in random 
order. To respond, participants clicked on one of the colors on the 
checkerboard. Already chosen colors were not available to be clicked on 
again in the same trial. Participants completed six practice trials with 
three attention probes, followed by 300 test trials with 60 attention 
probes. At test, the probes were spaced between three to seven trials 
apart. During practice, participants received performance feedback after 
each trial, and at test, after every 50 trials. Younger adults completed the 
task in approximately 60 min, and older adults in approximately 90 min. 
Supplementary analyses showed that longer task duration did not dis-
advantage older adults' attention ratings (see Appendix C). 
2.2.2. Reading task 
This task was modeled after Zedelius, Broadway, and Schooler 
Fig. 1. Predictions for the relationship between 
proportion of errors and attention ratings for 
younger and older adults. Panel A illustrates the 
prediction under the hypothesis that attention re-
ports are valid and the relationship between reports 
and performance is described by the same intercept 
and slope for both age groups. Panel B depicts the 
prediction under the hypothesis that older adults' 
attention reports are shifted upwards relative to the 
younger adults', but are valid in the sense that they 
covary with performance. Panel C illustrates the 
prediction under the hypothesis that older adults' 
reports do not covary with performance. 
1 This approach was taken to control for task difficulty across age groups. 
Capacity of WM declines across adult age (Brockmole & Logie, 2013). A recent 
study used an individual calibration procedure to equate memory load between 
younger and older adults in a delayed-estimation visual WM task (Loaiza & 
Souza, 2019). Their calibration results showed that older adults reached the 
same level of performance at a memory load of one item less than younger 
adults did. Based on these results, we presented older adults with one item less 
than the younger group, to preclude the confound of unequal task difficulty 
interacting with subjective attention ratings. 
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(2015). Participants read a text, presented one word at a time in the 
screen-center (white against a grey 128 128 128 background in Times 
font, size = 34). Participants pressed the right arrow-key to display the 
next word. To prevent accidental skipping, minimum display time was 
100 ms per word. Rereading previous text was not possible. Participants 
were instructed to read the text attentively and to report the presence of 
gibberish (nonsensical sentences) by pressing the left arrow key. After 
instruction, a 10-sentence example text with three attention probes 
followed. At test, participants read an abridged version of the in-
troduction and the first five chapters from the book “Sommersprossen 
auf den Knien” by Maria Parr in German (length = 2781 words), rated 
by the publisher as appropriate for an age of 8–10 years. 
The task phase presented 32 attention probes at quasi-random in-
tervals (16 following normal text passages and 16 following gibberish 
passages). The text was interspersed with 16 gibberish episodes, each 
five sentences long, at quasi-random intervals. Gibberish was created by 
Fig. 2. The task event flows illustrate a trial in the visual working memory task (A), a sentence in the reading task with sensible (B) and gibberish (C) text, and trials 
in the SART (D). Panel E depicts the attention probe. The stimuli are not to scale. 
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replacing story words with unrelated words. For example, the sentence 
“It is already a while ago” would become “It is pasture a try ago”. No 
pseudo-words were used. The presented gibberish passages were pre-
viously rated in a pilot test (N = 8, younger adults) as gibberish with 
maximum confidence on a scale of one to four. Each gibberish passage 
was presented either until detection or until the full five sentences were 
read (whatever occurred first), then followed directly by an attention 
probe. Thereafter, the text was resumed to the normal version from 
where gibberish had started. The normal text was augmented with 16 
added sentences presenting unique information (i.e., that occurred only 
once in the story) that matched the story framework (such as “The 
postman's name is Erik”), each followed by an attention probe. 
After the end of the reading task, a long-term memory (LTM) test 
assessed memory for each of the 16 unique sentences by presenting four 
answer options: the correct sentence and three foils (e.g., “The post-
man's name is Erik / Bernd / Anno / Bengt”). Participants were in-
structed to click on the sentence they remembered reading in the story. 
Younger adults completed the task in approximately 30 min, and older 
adults in approximately 60 min. As in visual working memory task, 
supplementary analyses showed no disadvantage for older adults' at-
tention ratings due to the longer task duration (see Appendix C). 
2.2.3. SART 
Participants were instructed to press the space bar for all digits 
between one and nine, except the digit three (aka no-go signal) 
(Robertson et al., 1997). The digits were presented in white against a 
grey background, in “Symbol” font, and in varying sizes (48, 72, 94, 
and 120 pts), according to the original task design by Robertson et al. 
(1997). All digits occurred with equal frequency. The digits remained 
onscreen for 500 ms and were masked by a disc (diameter = 60 pixels) 
with a cross for 700 ms. Responses were accepted until the onset of the 
next stimulus. Responses in the presence of the no-go stimulus were 
counted as commission errors. After every quarter of the trials, parti-
cipants received feedback on their cumulative accuracy in percentage. 
In case of no response for 10 trials in a row, the task would pause with 
an alert message. Instructions refrained from emphasizing either speed 
or accuracy (Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2012). Participants completed 18 
example trials and 54 practice trials with three attention probes each. 
The test phase (900 trials) was interspersed with 20 attention probes. 
The digits, digit size, and attention ratings were presented according to 
a predetermined pseudo-random schedule, equal for all participants. 
Twenty blocks were created, comprising the digits one to nine between 
three to seven times. Thus, a block length of three was made of three 
concatenated vectors of one to nine, randomly shuffled within the 
block. Half of the blocks ended with the no-go digit. An attention probe 
followed after the end of each block. The task pace was automated and 
hence the task took approximately 40 min for both age groups. 
At the end of each task, participants rated task difficulty and interest 
on a scale from one to nine. Thereafter, participants received feedback 
on their whole task performance. 
2.2.4. Current concerns questionnaire 
The Concerns Questionnaire was adapted with author's permission 
from the Personal Aspirations and Concerns Inventory (PACI; Cox, 
Klinger, & Fadardi, J. S. (Eds.)., 2011). The modifications were as fol-
lows: two life areas were removed for the reasons of privacy (Intimacy 
and Sexual Matters and Religion and Spiritual Matters), and area Education 
and Training was renamed Education and Self-Development, to address 
both age groups in equal measure. Furthermore, we introduced area 
Fitness and Sport to account for the high interest towards physical ex-
ercise in Switzerland, as well as area Other to accommodate concerns 
that did not fit into the provided categories. Participants were in-
structed to name concerns, if present, per area and rate each concern's 
importance on a scale from 0 (= barely important) to 10 (= highly 
important). Differently to the PACI, 10 instead of three rows per area 
were provided, and ratings instead of rankings of concerns were 
requested (see Appendix A for the instruction, list of life areas, and an 
example question). Participants were encouraged to write down “as 
many or as few concerns as they felt they had”. 
2.3. Procedure 
Participants completed the tasks across two sessions. Before the start 
of each session, they received instructions regarding the attention 
probes and practiced placing attention ratings three times in the pre-
sence of the research assistant. The first session consisted of the visual 
working memory task, followed by the completion of the 
Concerns Questionnaire. If they wished for, participants could take 
the questionnaire home and bring it back in the next session. The 
second session consisted of the reading task, a short break, and lastly 
the SART. 
3. Results 
3.1. Data analysis 
Main inferential analyses were implemented as Bayesian hierarchical 
logistic regressions using the rstanarm package (Goodrich, Gabry, Ali, & 
Brilleman, 2018) in R (R Core Team, 2018). We set weakly informative 
Cauchy priors with location 0 and scale 5 (Gelman et al., 2013) for the 
intercept and the coefficients. The rstanam package internally adjusts the 
user-provided prior scales to account for the scales of the predictors 
(Goodrich et al., 2018). Hence, we report automatically adjusted prior 
scales when applicable. As a model quality statistic, we report the ratio of 
effective to total Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) samples. The ef-
fective sample size is the number of independent (non-autocorrelated) 
draws from the posterior distribution. Highly autocorrelated draws 
hinder the exploration of the parameter space by covering a small area of 
the posterior distribution and thus lead to unreliable estimates. The ef-
fective/total sample size ratio should be > 0.1 (Goodrich et al., 2018). 
The analyses of task performance used the logit link and four chains 
of the MCMC sampling with 2000 iterations per chain. The first 1000 
samples of each chain were discarded as warm-up, resulting in 4000 
posterior distribution samples for each analysis. For all reported 
models, the R statistic was < 1.02, indicating that the chains converged 
to the same posterior distribution. For inference, we assessed whether 
the 95% highest density interval (HDI) of the posterior parameter dis-
tributions included zero. 
Furthermore, we also used Bayesian t-tests and Bayesian analyses of 
variance (BANOVAS) from the BayesFactor package (R. D. Morey, 
Rouder, Jamil, Forner, & Ly, 2018). We regarded Bayes factors (BF) 
between 3 and 10 as substantial, and larger than 30 as strong evidence 
in favor of H1. Likewise, BFs between 0.3 and 0.10 were interpreted as 
substantial evidence for H0 and BFs lower than 0.03 were regarded as 
strong evidence for H0 (Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, & van der 
Maas, 2011). Ambiguous evidence for H0 was indicated by BFs in the 
range 0.3 to 1 and for H1 in the range 1 to 3. 
All materials, data, and analysis scripts are available at https://osf. 
io/z7fdk/?view_only=9ca5956a57c144ea9947e39d088c3245. 
3.2. Visual working memory task 
Dependent measures in this task were (1) number of correctly re-
ported items, (2) proportion of trials with lapses, and (3) attention 
ratings. Lapses reflect trials in which, presumably due to disengagement 
from the task, participants failed to store any information about the 
array, forcing them to guess (Adam & Vogel, 2017). Lapse trials are 
operationalized as trials with fewer than two correct responses (a single 
correct response could plausibly arise from guessing). Descriptive sta-
tistics of these measures are presented in Table 1 and histograms of 
response frequencies of the number of correctly reported memory items 
and attention ratings are presented in Appendix E (Fig. E1). 
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First, we assessed whether task performance in probed trials differed 
from that in non-probed trials. A 2 (age group) × 2 (probed, non-probed) 
BANOVA on number of correctly reported items showed that performance 
in probed and non-probed trials did not differ (evidence for the probe factor 
was BF = 0.16). Evidence for an interaction did not reach the credible 
range (BF ratio = 2.92). The same analysis on lapse rates demonstrated that 
older adults lapsed more than younger adults (BF ratio = 20), but there was 
no evidence that this differed between probed and non-probed trials (evi-
dence for inclusion of probe factor: BF ratio = 0.38 and for the interac-
tion = 0.36). Together, the analyses suggested that the probed trial subset is 
an appropriate representation of the whole dataset. 
Second, we assessed the relation between attention ratings and task 
performance. Fig. 3 displays scatterplots of the relation of attention 
ratings and the number of correctly recalled items and lapse proportion 
at the individual level. For number of correct items, increases in at-
tention ratings were associated with increases in the number of correct 
recalls for both age groups. For lapse proportion, the converse was true: 
Increases in attention ratings were associated with lower lapse rates. 
We modeled the relationship between attention and number of cor-
rect recalls in probed trials with a binomial Bayesian hierarchical re-
gression model having attention rating and age group as (mean-centered) 
predictors. The adjusted prior scale for the coefficients was = [2.57, 
5.00, 4.04], effective/total sample size ratio  >  0.24, and the number of 
effective samples > 883. Means and HDIs of the posterior distributions 
are summarized in Table 2, and the model predictions are presented in  
Fig. 3 (dotted lines). The analysis showed two credible main effects: (1) 
higher reported attention predicted higher memory accuracy, and (2) 
older adults reported fewer correct items than younger adults did. The 
interaction term was not credible, indicating that the relationship of at-
tention and accuracy was comparable in both age groups. The results did 
not change when mean number of correct items in the two or three trials 
before the probe was entered as dependent variable (Table 2). 
Next, we analyzed whether attention ratings and age group predicted 
the probability of having lapsed in the trial just before. The adjusted 
prior scale for the coefficients was = [2.58, 5.00, 4.04], effective/total 
sample size ratio  >  0.32, and the number of effective samples > 895. 
Paralleling the previous analysis, credible effects indicated that higher 
attention was associated with lower lapse rates, and that older adults 
experienced more lapses than younger adults (see Table 2). Again, the 
interaction term was not credible, indicating that the attention-perfor-
mance association did not differ between age groups. 
Effect sizes (standardized coefficients) for these models were com-
puted with the “effectsize” package in R (Ben-Shachar, Makowski, & 
Lüdecke, 2020) and are reported in Table 2. 
3.3. Reading task 
After excluding key presses longer than four seconds (6% of the 
dataset), the average reading speed per word was MYounger = 328 ms 
(SD = 317) and MOlder = 579 ms (SD = 432). The main dependent 
variables in this task were (a) number of gibberish sentences read until 
detection, (b) long term memory (LTM) accuracy scores, and (c) 
attention ratings, visualized in Fig. 4. Table 1 presents descriptive sta-
tistics for these variables. 
Only two out of 1344 gibberish occurrences went undetected. Most 
occurrences were detected in the first sentence (85.19%). Given that 
most of the gibberish was detected early, we reduced the number of 
levels of our predicted variable by re-coding the data such that gib-
berish detection during the second sentence or later was defined as a 
lapse. Fig. 4 displays gibberish detection lapses and proportion of cor-
rect responses in the LTM test as a function of attention ratings. A 
Bayesian t-test showed that older adults had fewer gibberish detection 
lapses than younger adults, BF10 = 15. 
First, we analyzed gibberish detection lapses as a function of at-
tention rating and age group with a binomial Bayesian hierarchical 
regression (adjusted prior scale for the coefficients = [3.90, 5.00, 
3.28], effective/total sample size ratio  >  0.10, number of effective 
samples > 368). Higher attention ratings credibly predicted fewer 
gibberish detection lapses (see parameter's HDI in Table 2). The HDI of 
the age group predictor and the interaction term both included zero, 
indicating that, firstly, the model did not identify a credible main effect 
of age group on lapse rate, and secondly, that attention ratings were 
similarly predictive for both groups' task performance. 
Because the t-test had supported age group difference in gibberish 
detection but the main analysis did not, we hypothesized that the group 
effect was fully accounted for by the higher attention ratings of older 
adults. We repeated the analysis with only age group as a predictor, and 
the group term was now credible (mean = −0.61; 95% HDI = [−0.90, 
−0.32]). In other words, when attention ratings were not included as a 
predictor, the analysis revealed that older adults had fewer detection 
lapses than younger adults, but this effect was accounted for by in-
cluding attention ratings as predictors. 
Second, we analyzed accuracy in the LTM test. Binary response 
accuracy for each story fact presented directly before an attention probe 
in the non-gibberish text was entered in a binomial Bayesian hier-
archical regression with attention rating and age group as mean-cen-
tered predictors (adjusted prior scale = [4.45,5.00,3.13], effective/ 
total sample size ratio  >  0.10, number of effective samples > 359). 
For this model, no predictor had a credible effect on LTM accuracy (see  
Table 2). To investigate between-group memory accuracy in-
dependently of attention ratings, we repeated the analysis with only age 
group as a predictor. This revealed a credible group effect, namely that 
older adults' memory accuracy was poorer than younger adults' 
(mean = −0.09; 95% HDI = [−0.14, −0.04]). Effect sizes (standar-
dized coefficients) for these models are reported in Table 2. 
As attention ratings were skewed to high responses, we repeated the 
analyses with binned ratings. The results' pattern did not change either 
for gibberish detection nor for the LTM analysis (see Appendix F for 
histograms of response frequencies and supplemental analyses' reports). 
3.4. SART 
Dependent variables in this task were (1) commission errors and (2) 
attention ratings. Omissions were not of primary interest but are 
Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of the Dependent Variables in the Visual Working Memory and Reading tasks.               
Visual working memory task Reading task 
Probed trials Non-probed trials Gibberish detection LTM test  
Variable Younger Older Younger Older Variable Younger Older Variable Younger Older 
# Correct Items 3 (1.28) 2.15 (1.06) 2.97 (1.26) 2.18 (1.08) Detection Delay 1.23 (0.53) 1.12 (0.40) Memory Accuracy 0.75 (0.43) 0.65 (0.47) 
Proportion Lapses 0.13 (0.34) 0.25 (0.43) 0.13 (0.34) 0.24 (0.42) Proportion Lapses 0.19 (0.39) 0.10 (0.30) – – – 
AR 6.20 (2) 6.93 (1.80) – – AR 7.34 (1.44) 8.26 (0.91) AR* 7.71 (1.25) 8.31 (0.91) 
AR Reliability 0.82 0.88 – – AR Reliability 0.82 0.86  AR Reliability* 0.78 0.90 
Note. AR – Attention Rating. Reliability estimates were calculated with the Spearman-Brown's correction. Visual working memory task: lapse ≤ 2 correct responses. 
Reading Task: detection delay is in averaged sentences. Lapse = detection later than in the first sentence. *Attention ratings listed for the LTM test were collected 
during the reading phase of non-gibberish passages.  
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included in descriptive statistics for completeness (Table 3). Supple-
mentary analyses of reaction times are presented in Appendix B and Fig. 
D1 in A and Fig. D1 in Appendix D visualizes commission errors and 
attention ratings as a function of time on task. First, we assessed whe-
ther commission errors differed between the attention-probed and the 
non-probed trials with a 2 (age group) × 2 (probed, non-probed) BA-
NOVA. There was ambiguous evidence against difference between at-
tention-probed and non-probed trials (BF ratio = 0.33), and strong 
support for an age group difference in error rates (BF ratio = 42), with 
older adults committing fewer errors. Finally, there was evidence 
against interaction (BF ratio = 0.20). 
It has been suggested that awareness of an error can increase one's 
attention and hence, an attention probe after an error may not be in-
dicative of one's attention state that led to the commission of the error 
(Jackson & Balota, 2012; Smallwood, Riby, Heim, & Davies, 2006). 
Conversely, one could argue that people could infer from having just 
committed an error that they must have been inattentive, and therefore 
report less attentiveness when probed right after an error. If the 
attention reports are influenced by people's errors, rather than the other 
way around, then we should expect overall lower attentiveness ratings 
to thought probes after no-go trials than after go- trials, because people 
commit virtually no errors on the go- trials. There was little evidence 
for that prediction: Inspection of Table 3 shows that attention ratings 
were quite similar between no-go and go trials, particularly for older 
adults. This suggests that errors did not strongly bias attentional re-
ports. Statistically, a 2 (group) × 2 (trial type) BANOVA on attention 
ratings showed that the best model included the main effect of group 
and trial type and their interaction (BF10 = 3.50). Comparison of the 
model including trial type to the model without it showed ambiguous 
evidence for retaining it in the model (BFGroup+Type = 0.89 over 
BFGroup = 0.74, BF ratio = 1.20). 
Fig. 5 visualizes that commissions decreased as attention ratings in-
creased for both age groups. We assessed this data with a binomial Baye-
sian hierarchical regression model (adjusted prior scale = [2.84,5.00, 
3.57], effective/total sample size ratio  >  0.13, number of effective sam-
ples > 503). Posterior distributions of the analysis are summarized in  
Fig. 3. Proportion of lapse trials (A), and number of correctly reported items (B) in the visual working memory task. Individual points are participants' aggregated 
data for a given level of the predictor, solid lines are the group mean, and dashed lines are the models' predictions. Error bars represent the 95% within subjects' 
confidence intervals for the observed data and 95% HDIs for the predicted values. 
Table 2 
Posterior Estimates of the Effect of Predictors of the Visual WM, Gibberish Detection, LTM and SART Analyses.              
Visual working memory task Reading task SART 
Items Lapses Gibberish Lapses LTM Accuracy Commissions  
Parameters Mean 95% HDI Mean 95% HDI Mean 95% HDI Mean 95% HDI Mean 95% HDI 
Attention rating 0.21 [0.17, 0.25] −0.43 [−0.53, −0.34] −0.36 [−0.59, −0.12] −0.02 [−0.13, 0.08] −0.11 [−0.24, −0.005] 
Attention rating† 0.41 [0.33, 0.49] −0.84 [−1.03, −0.66] −0.46 [−0.76, −0.16] −0.02 [−0.17, 0.11] −0.20 [−0.43, −0.009] 
(2 trials)** 0.15 [0.11, 0.19]         
(3 trials)*** 0.13 [0.10, 0.17]         
Group −0.34 [−0.60, −0.06] 1.12 [0.61, 1.62] −0.58 [−2.04, 0.75] −0.19 [−0.95, 0.52] −0.48 [−1.13, 0.21] 
Group† −0.17 [−0.30, −0.03] 0.56 [0.30, 0.81] −0.29 [−1.02, 0.37] −0.09 [−0.54, 0.34] −0.24 [−0.56, 0.10] 
(2 trials)** −1.02 [−1.16, −0.88]         
(3 trials)*** −0.95 [−1.09, −0.82]         
Interaction −0.06 [−0.14, 0.01] 0.07 [−0.11, 0.27] 0.008 [−0.41, 0.45] −0.09 [−0.32, 0.13] −0.07 [−0.30, 0.15] 
Interaction † −0.03 [−0.07, 0.008] 0.03 [−0.05, 0.13] 0.004 [−0.20, 0.22] −0.04 [−0.18, 0.09] −0.03 [−0.15, 0.07] 
(2 trials)** −0.02 [−0.08, 0.04]         
(3 trials)*** −0.02 [−0.08, 0.03]         
Note. HDI = Highest Density Interval; Boldface denotes credible effects (parameters' 95% HDI does not include zero). For the visual working memory tasks, 
supplementary analyses aggregated over two** or three*** trials preceding an attention probe were performed. Parameter values are on the logit scale. † = point 
summaries of standardized coefficients.  
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Table 2. The results showed that higher attention ratings predicted fewer 
commissions, but age group did not have an additional effect on com-
mission rates. The interaction term was not credible, indicating that at-
tention ratings were similarly predictive of performance in younger and 
older adults. 
As previously, we followed up the lack of age group effect with a 
repeated analysis, including only age group as a predictor. Here, a 
credible effect on commission errors was evident (mean = −0.36, 95% 
HDI = [−0.59, −0.14]). Similar to the gibberish analysis, the age- 
group effect was fully accounted for by the fact that older adults gave 
higher attention ratings when these ratings were included as predictor 
in the model. Effect sizes (standardized coefficients) for this model are 
reported in Table 2. 
As attention ratings were skewed to high responses, we repeated the 
analyses with binned ratings (see Appendix F for histograms of response 
frequencies and supplemental analyses' reports). This changed the pat-
tern of the results, such that whereas the Group term was still credible, 
attention ratings were no longer predictive of errors in the SART. 
3.5. Perceived task difficulty 
One concern for the assessment of self-reported attention across age is 
that the tasks may present unequal difficulty for older compared to 
younger adults, which may lead to a bias in self-rated attention. To 
monitor perceived difficulty across tasks and age, at the end of each task, 
we solicited ratings on a 1–9 scale (1 = “Not at All Difficult”, 9 = “Very 
Difficult”), visualized in Fig. 6A. Submitting these ratings to a 2 (age 
group) × 3 (task) BANOVA showed that best model included the main 
Fig. 4. Proportion of gibberish detection lapses (A), and proportion of correct responses in the long-term memory test (B) in the reading task. Individual points are 
participants’ aggregated data for a given level of the predictor, solid lines are the group mean, and dashed lines are the models’ predictions. Error bars represent the 
95% within subjects’ confidence intervals for the observed data and 95% HDIs for the predicted values. 
Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of the Dependent Variables in the SART task.        
Variable Probed trials  Non-probed trials 
Younger Older  Younger Older  
Commissions 0.43 (0.18) 0.29 (0.22)  0.45 (0.16) 0.31 (0.18) 
Omissions 0.01 (0.03) 0.004 (0.02)  0.009 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Attention ratings (no-go) 7.05 (1.58) 7.32 (1.21)  – – 
Attention ratings (go) 6.73 (1.73) 7.34 (1.27)  – – 
Attention rating reliability 0.85 0.82  – – 
Note. Commissions (no-go errors) and omissions (go-errors) are reported as a proportion. Reliability estimates were calculated with the Spearman-Brown's correction.  
Fig. 5. Proportion of commission errors in the SART task. Individual points are 
participants’ aggregated data for a given level of the predictor, solid lines are 
the group mean, and dashed lines are the models’ predictions. Error bars re-
present the 95% within subjects’ confidence intervals for the observed data and 
95% HDIs for the predicted values. 
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effects of group and task (BF10 = 1.56 × 10
11). Models comparisons 
yielded strong evidence for the effect of task (BFGroup+Task = 1.56 × 10
11 
over BFGroup = 0.70, BF ratio = 2.13 × 10
11). Older adults reported 
somewhat higher difficulty, but there was no credible evidence for (or 
against) the effect of age, as the evidence was ambiguous (BFGroup 
+Task = 1.56 × 10
11 over BFTask = 1.43 × 10
11, BF ratio = 1.04). The 
interaction of these factors was rejected (BF ratio = 0.10). 
3.6. Attention and current concerns 
Descriptive statistics as well as split-half reliabilities of attention 
ratings in the visual working memory and reading tasks are presented in  
Table 1, and these measures for the SART appear in Table 3. Fig. 6B 
presents the average ratings of attention per age group and task. 
First, we checked whether attention ratings differed as a function of 
age group and task with a 2 (age group) × 3 (task) BANOVA. Overall, 
attention reports were higher for older compared to younger adults, and 
they were higher in the reading task than the SART task, with the lowest 
values being observed in the visual working memory task. Accordingly, 
the best model in the BANOVA included only the main effects of age 
group and task (BF10 = 2.65 × 10
9), which was preferred by a factor of 
8 to the second-best model, which includes the interaction. 
The second goal of this study was to investigate whether (a) younger 
and older adults differ in the number of current concerns or concern 
importance ratings, as suggested by the Control Failure x Concerns view of 
MW (McVay et al., 2013), and (b) whether these variables predict at-
tention levels during the tasks. Dependent variables were (1) the number 
of concerns and (2) mean concern importance rating per participant. Two 
older adults' questionnaires were not completed according to the in-
structions and not analyzable. A concern was coded whenever a state-
ment was formulated in reference to the participant (e.g., “I want to do 
more sports”). No concern was coded if the statement was not self-re-
ferent (e.g., “Sports are a good thing”). Importance ratings were only 
included in the analysis if a concern was coded. Concerns listed twice 
within the questionnaire (e.g., “I want to do more sports” both in the 
categories “health” and “fitness”) were coded only once. 
Descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 4. Bayesian t-tests 
showed ambiguous evidence against an age group difference in the sum of 
concerns (BF10 = 0.35), and also in mean concern importance 
(BF10 = 0.44). Next, we assessed whether age group and sum of partici-
pants' current concerns predicted mean attention ratings in Bayesian linear 
regressions implemented in rstanarm. We used the default priors provided 
for the Gaussian family (adjusted scale = 8.58 for the intercept 
and = [2.14,2.38,2.61] for the coefficients) with the identity link and 
report the full model as the most informative. The number of effective 
samples was > 1549 and the effective/total sample size ratio  >  0.58. The 
model's posterior parameters are summarized in Table 5 and visualized 
along the data in Fig. 7. The main effect of age group indicated that older 
adults' overall attention ratings were higher, but there was no credible 
effect of sum of current concerns on attention ratings, nor an interaction. 
The results did not change with the mean of concerns as a predictor. 
Next, we repeated the analysis with mean rated concern importance 
(adjusted prior scale = 8.58 for the intercept, and [2.14,1.08,0.72] for 
the coefficients, effective samples > 1617, effective/total sample size 
ratio  >  0.43). The results followed the same pattern: older adults' 
mean rated attention was higher than younger adults', but mean con-
cern importance did not predict attention ratings. 
4. Discussion 
The current study assessed the validity of older adults' attention 
reports in comparison to younger adults. We measured attention state 
on a continuous scale to circumvent problems of interpretation and 
criterion changes in classifying thoughts in dichotomous categories 
across age. Thought probes were presented in two tasks that were 
previously employed in MW research, namely a reading task and SART, 
as well as in a visual working memory task. 
4.1. Are the on-task reports of older adults valid? 
Our main concern was to understand whether older adults' attention 
reports covary with fluctuations in task performance, as has been pre-
viously observed for younger adults in working memory tasks (Adam & 
Vogel, 2017; Krimsky et al., 2017; Unsworth & Robison, 2016) as well 
as in MW studies using a continuous scale to measure on-task attention 
(Allen et al., 2013; Levinson et al., 2012; Mittner et al., 2014; Morrison, 
Goolsarran, Rogers, & Jha, 2014; Qin, Perdoni, & He, 2011; Ruby, 
Smallwood, Engen, & Singer, 2013; Smallwood, Ruby, & Singer, 2013). 
The covariation between self-reported fluctuations in attention and 
fluctuations in performance has been taken as evidence of good meta- 
knowledge about one's attentional state (Adam & Vogel, 2017). Our 
rationale was that observing these covariations would allow us to assess 
how well older adults can monitor the degree to which their attention is 
currently on task. 
We obtained largely consistent results across all three tasks: There 
was a credible relation between attention ratings and task performance 
Fig. 6. Difficulty and Attention ratings per task. Error bars represent the 95% within-subjects' confidence intervals. Note that difficulty ratings were solicited once per 
task, whereas attention was surveyed multiple times in each task. 
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in both age groups. For all tasks, there was no evidence for an interaction 
between attention rating and age group, indicating that attention reports 
were equally predictive of performance for younger and older adults. 
This finding supports the validity of attention self-reports across age. The 
only exception to this general pattern was performance in the LTM test 
for the reading passages, which did not yield credible evidence for any 
relation between attention ratings and performance in either age group. 
We surmise that this null result occurred because we tested memory for 
incidentally encoded details that were unimportant for the text com-
prehension or gibberish detection. Hence, it is likely that our attention 
assessment, targeting attention to the task, did not capture attention to 
these relatively task-irrelevant details, and was therefore unrelated to 
how well these details were encoded into episodic memory. 
Overall, our results suggest that healthy older adults' ability to monitor 
and report their current degree of attention is comparable to that of 
younger adults'. These results resonate with studies showing preserved 
meta-cognitive monitoring in aging (Castel, Middlebrooks, & McGillivray, 
2015; Hertzog & Dunlosky, 2011). These results are also consistent with a 
recent study investigating variations in visual working memory perfor-
mance and meta-cognitive monitoring across age in a big sample of over 
600 individuals (Mitchell, Cusack, & Cam-CAN, 2018). Mitchell and Cusack 
showed that older adults tended to be slightly overconfident in low 
memory load trials, but reports tracked trial-by-trial performance fluctua-
tions similarly across age. Furthermore, better cognitive monitoring was 
associated with better performance irrespective of age. Altogether, these 
findings and ours point to the possibility that the intercept of older adults' 
attention ratings may be shifted upwards, but the attention-performance 
relationship can be described with the same slope in both age groups. 
4.2. Why do older adults report to be on task more than younger adults? 
We addressed a concern raised by Frank et al. (2015) that younger 
and older adults might differ in their criterion for classifying attention 
focus using dichotomous categories such as on-task vs. MW. Previous 
research has shown that older adults report fewer MW than younger 
adults and higher proportion of task-related interference thoughts 
(Frank et al., 2015; McVay et al., 2013; Zavagnin et al., 2014), but the 
reasons for these differences are yet under debate. Here, we used a 
continuous rating scale to minimize the possibility that criterion 
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics for Current Concerns and Concern Importance Ratings per Life Area and Age Group.          
Sum of concerns (range) Mean of concerns (SD) Mean importance ratings (SD) 
Area Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older  
Budget 50 (0–4) 38 (0–3) 1.25 (0.89) 0.90 (0.93) 6.01 (3.51) 4.50 (4.17) 
Fitness 56 (0–5) 49 (0–5) 1.40 (1.03) 1.16 (1.34) 5.62 (2.91) 4.68 (3.97) 
Health 56 (0–4) 57 (0–6) 1.40 (0.90) 1.35 (1.24) 6.68 (3.24) 6.32 (3.84) 
Home 73 (0–4) 62 (0–6) 1.82 (1.10) 1.47 (1.58) 6.45 (2.65) 5.14 (3.82) 
Other 11 (0–5) 35 (0–5) 0.27 (1.01) 0.83 (1.24) 0.83 (2.56) 3.50 (4.32) 
Recreation 74 (0–4) 70 (0–5) 1.85 (1.09) 1.66 (1.37) 6.69 (3.02) 6.88 (3.32) 
Relationships 67 (0–5) 60 (0–7) 1.67 (1.20) 1.42 (1.62) 6.82 (3.33) 5.96 (4.06) 
Work 67 (0–5) 39 (0–4) 1.67 (1.16) 0.92 (1.23) 6.82 (3.09) 3.92 (4.26) 
Self-Development 74 (0–4) 70 (0–5) 1.85 (1.09) 1.66 (1.37) 6.69 (3.02) 6.88 (3.32) 
Overall 528 480 1.41 (0.74) 1.21 (1.02) 5.74 (1.48) 5.09 (2.44) 
Note. SD = Standard Deviation.  
Table 5 
Posterior Estimates of the Effect of Number (Sum) of Current Concerns and 
Mean Concern Importance on Attention Ratings.       
Parameters Sum of Concerns Concern Importance 
Mean 95% HDI Mean 95% HDI  
Intercept 7.03 [6.70, 7.35] 6.75 [6.15, 7.35] 
Age Group 0.72 [0.05, 1.38] 1.16 [0.05, 2.29] 
Concerns 0.01 [−0.009, 0.03] 0.07 [−0.02, 0.17] 
Age Group x Concerns −0.004 [−0.04, 0.04] −0.08 [−0.27, 0.10] 
Note. HDI = Highest Density Interval; Boldface denotes credible effects 
(parameters' 95% HDI does not include zero).  
Fig. 7. The scatterplots display individual participants' responses in the concerns questionnaire (x-axis) and their mean attention rating across the tasks (y-axis) for 
number of concerns (left panel) and rated concern importance (right panel). Dashed lines are the regression models' predictions. Error bars are the 95% HDIs for the 
predicted values. 
A. Arnicane, et al.   Cognition 206 (2021) 104482
11
changes between groups in classifying thoughts in one category vs. the 
other would obscure the assessment of the relationship between self- 
reports and performance. The use of a continuous scale did not change 
the main pattern of findings in the literature: Older adults' overall re-
ported attention was higher than younger adults'. 
Our results are consistent with two possibilities. One is that older 
adults have a bias to report higher attention; the other is that they ac-
tually sustain their attention focus more often or more continuously on 
the current task than younger adults do. For the gibberish detection and 
SART tasks we have no reason to believe that older adults' attention 
ratings were biased upward: Attention ratings predicted performance in 
both age groups with the same regression line. In the visual working 
memory task, older adults' higher attention ratings were accompanied by 
poorer performance, so that using the same regression line for both age 
groups would lead to an over-prediction of older adults' performance. 
This could mean that the attention ratings of older adults were biased 
upward. Alternatively, it could mean that their performance is impaired 
relative to that of younger adults' by a factor independent of their at-
tentional state, such that, with an equal degree of attentional focus on the 
task, older adults perform more poorly than younger adults. 
One possibility that could lead to an upward attention-rating bias is 
that the tasks may be more difficult for the older individuals. Given that 
VWM capacity is reduced in older age (Brockmole & Logie, 2013), this 
concern is especially plausible for the VWM task. Although participants' 
ratings of perceived task difficulty did not differ across age in the present 
study, it is of theoretical importance to consider the implications of task 
demand on the experience and self-appraisal of attention. VWM main-
tenance is assumed to demand attention (C. C. Morey & Bieler, 2013), 
and some theoretical accounts view VWM as sustained attention to the 
memory representations (Chun, 2011). Accordingly, the difficulty to 
maintain memory representations accessible may lead to higher attention 
investment and hence, to valid ratings of higher attention. 
An alternative possibility is that perceived task difficulty could serve 
as an internal cue for attention appraisals, without leading to increased 
attentional effort. According to the cue-utilization approach to meta-
memory (Koriat, 1997), participants use a variety of cues, − in addition 
to evaluating the strength of a memory trace – when forming predictions 
of their own memory performance on a delayed test. On a more difficult 
task, the effort of memory maintenance could thus serve as a heuristic 
cue for attention appraisal, thereby resulting in upward-biased ratings. 
However, previous research showed that higher attentional demand 
tends to decrease self-reported attentiveness. Higher task difficulty is as-
sumed to demand more attention control, and this construct has been 
linked to individual differences in MW propensity in younger adults (Kane 
et al., 2007; McVay & Kane, 2012b). According to these studies, younger 
individuals with lower WM capacity self-report lower attention during 
more demanding tasks. This resonates with our findings that self-rated 
attention was higher in tasks rated as less difficult for both age groups. 
Therefore, we find it implausible that older adults' attention ratings were 
biased upward by experiencing the tasks as more difficult than young 
adults, and we find it even more implausible that the attention ratings are 
biased upward in one task (visual WM) but not two others. 
Conversely, on the assumption that older adults' working memory 
capacity is much reduced compared to that of young adults', it is 
plausible that their performance on a test of working memory is im-
paired, whereas their performance on two other tasks that rely much 
less on working memory is not impaired. This interpretation implies 
that older adults' reduced working memory capacity does not arise from 
a higher prevalence of attentional lapses in that age group. Rather, it 
arises from a genuine reduction in their ability to hold information in 
working memory, for instance due to a reduction in memory resources 
(Ma, Husain, & Bays, 2014) or due to an increased vulnerability to 
interference (Oberauer & Lin, 2017). 
Assuming that the attention ratings of older adults are valid, we must 
conclude that they do invest more sustained attention than younger 
adults, either due to higher motivation (Staub, Doignon-Camus, Bacon, & 
Bonnefond, 2014; Tomporowski & Tinsley, 1996) or as a compensation 
for age-related decline in ability (Staub et al., 2014). The results regarding 
age differences in performance-based measures of sustained attention are 
mixed: Some investigations report that older adults' sustained attention 
performance is on par or even superior to that of younger adults' 
(Carriere, Cheyne, Solman, & Smilek, 2010; Jackson & Balota, 2012;  
Jackson, Weinstein, & Balota, 2013; Parasuraman, Nestor, & Greenwood, 
1989; Staub et al., 2014; Tomporowski & Tinsley, 1996), whereas other 
studies found a decline in older adults' sustained attention compared to 
younger participants (Fortenbaugh et al., 2015; Giambra, 1997;  
McAvinue et al., 2012). For example, assessing > 600 individuals aged 14 
to 77 on the SART, Carriere et al. (2010) found linear decreases in 
commission errors with age, implying that sustained attention got better 
with advancing age. By contrast, another large online study observed an 
age-related decline in sustained attention with N  >  10.000 (Fortenbaugh 
et al., 2015). However, the sample size in this study was heavily skewed 
towards younger age, such that the number of 60+ participants was 
disproportionately small, and the task duration was rather short (four 
minutes). Therefore, it is unclear whether older adults may have been 
somewhat disadvantaged by the short time to adjust to the task. Recent 
work suggested that the discrepant results in the literature may be due to 
whether the task activates automatic processes (as the regular SART, re-
quiring frequent responses) or controlled processes, as in a vigilance task 
with responses to rare targets (Staub, Doignon-Camus, Marques-Carneiro, 
Bacon, & Bonnefond, 2015). In a lab-based study, these authors found 
that age effects in the tasks were reversed: Older adults showed decre-
ments in sustained attention when rare, but not when frequent re-
sponding was required, whereas the pattern for younger adults was the 
opposite. They suggested that older adults are able to sustain their at-
tention even better than younger adults because they adopt a more 
controlled strategy, but this approach is beneficial only for tasks with a 
high level of automaticity (Staub et al., 2015), such as the SART that is 
widely used in MW research. We surmise that older adults may deploy 
sustained attention more consistently than younger adults as a strategy to 
compensate for decline in working memory capacity, which is greatly 
reduced in older adults (Brockmole & Logie, 2013). 
In contrast to the Control ControlFailure x Concerns theory (McVay & 
Kane, 2010), Smallwood and Schooler (2006) proposed that MW itself 
requires executive resources, supporting their argument with the evidence 
that off-task thought is reduced when task demands increase. These au-
thors suggested that, as MW episodes reflect a coordinated, coherent train 
of thought, executive control is required to coordinate information to 
enable this mentation. The prediction that may be derived from this view 
is that older adults mind-wander less than young adults, as their reduced 
working memory capacity does not allow to divide attention between on- 
and off-task thoughts as well as it does for younger adults. In a recent 
theoretical development, Smallwood (2013) further asserted that execu-
tive attention is specifically needed for the continuation of engagement in 
MW to ensure the continuity of internal thought. If this is the case, it is 
possible that, due to age-related decline in executive resources, older 
adults both lapse more frequently and are also less able to sustain the off- 
task train of thought, their attention being rapidly returned to the task due 
to its external salience, as older adults rely more on external information 
(Lindenberger & Mayr, 2014). As a consequence, their mind would stray 
off task more often, but only very briefly, so that a larger proportion of 
attention probes catches them during on-time episodes. In conclusion, the 
hypothesis of Smallwood and Schooler is better compatible with our 
findings than the Control Failure x Concerns theory. 
4.3. MW and current concerns 
Contrary to Parks et al. (1989), we did not observe an age difference in 
personal concerns: the comparisons yielded ambiguous evidence. Fur-
thermore, concerns did not predict mean reported attention. Older adults 
may nurture fewer long-term goals, as their future entails fewer normative 
life events – biological, psychological and social life transitions that are 
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highly correlated with chronological age (Cavanaugh & Blanchard-Fields, 
2018) – than younger adults'. However, healthy and active older adults 
probably have a busy agenda that is comparable to that of younger adults', 
and thus a commensurate amount of current concerns. 
The lack of correlation between concerns and mean attention does 
not disprove the contention that MW emerges from the interaction of 
current concerns, environmental cues, and the person's attention con-
trol ability (McVay et al., 2013). Rather, it suggests a methodological 
challenge: Possibly, the relationship between MW and concerns be-
comes evident across a longer time span than that of a lab-based study. 
For example, Song and Wang (2012) investigated MW with daily-life 
experience sampling, collecting detailed descriptions of MW episodes. 
When participants reported that an occurrence of MW was triggered by 
an internal cue (a thought or a memory), the content of these MW 
episodes was significantly related to these participants' personal plans – 
in other words, their current concerns. Thus, assessing the relationship 
between concerns, MW occurrences and executive control as proposed 
by the Control Failure x Concerns view may require a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative data collected across longer time periods. 
Another possibility is that the relationship between current con-
cerns and MW manifests on a different time frame than is assessed by 
the questionnaire we used, which inquiries about long-term, high-im-
portance life goals. In contrast, recent research revealed that the con-
tents of future-oriented MW often revolve around short-term goals such 
as errands, which may be described as a prospective memory function 
(for a review, see Kvavilashvili & Rummel, 2020). Indeed, a large body 
of studies addressing qualitative aspects of the MW reports showed that 
MW thoughts are often future-oriented (for a review, see Stawarczyk, 
2018). This finding has been also reported in a sample of older adults 
(Jackson et al., 2013). Moreover, Warden, Plimpton, and Kvavilashvili 
(2019) found that younger and older adults reported thinking about the 
future equally frequently. Future-thought contents often concern im-
mediately pending activities (Baird, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011) and 
tasks upcoming within the next month (Plimpton, Patel, & 
Kvavilashvili, 2015), week, or even on the same day (Baumeister, 
Hofmann, Summerville, Reiss, & Vohs, 2020; Stawarczyk, Cassol, & 
D'Argembeau, 2013; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, Van der Linden, & 
D'Argembeau, 2011). Future-oriented spontaneous thoughts may serve 
the function of prospective memory rehearsal and thus help achieve 
peoples' daily goals (Klinger, 2009; Kvavilashvili & Rummel, 2020;  
Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013), as the frequency of spontaneous future- 
oriented thoughts positively correlates with successful prospective 
memory-task completion (Seli, Smilek, Ralph, & Schacter, 2018) and 
memory recall (Steindorf & Rummel, 2017). 
Together, this evidence indicates that current concerns – particularly, 
imminent action goals – play a role in MW. Therefore, it may be im-
portant to survey participants' near-future goals, and collect this data on 
each experimental session. For example, Parks et al. (1989) administered 
all questionnaire measures in a single session, whereas we did not control 
for questionnaire filling time, encouraging participants to take the 
questionnaires home if they wished. In the autobiographical memory 
literature, it has been observed that older adults tend to generate less 
detailed episodic events in a given time interval compared to younger 
adults (Addis, Musicaro, Pan, & Schacter, 2010; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 
2008). Although also some younger adults took questionnaires home, we 
surmise that especially for older adults, the extra time may have enabled 
a more complete listing of their relevant concerns. 
In any case, we found no evidence for the contention that the reason 
for older adults' reduced report of MW is their decreased number or 
importance of current concerns. 
5. Conclusion 
Older adults report less MW episodes than younger adults. This 
challenges the view of MW as arising from failures of executive control, 
an ability assumed to decline with aging. Here we assessed and found 
no evidence for the hypothesis that older adults are less able to appraise 
fluctuations in their attentional state leading to low validity of their 
self-reports of MW. Our results point to a preserved ability to monitor 
one's own state of attentional focus in older age. 
This means that reduced reports of MW in older age are probably valid. 
We also found little evidence for a systematic, task-general bias to under- 
report MW in older compared to younger adults. Our results underscore the 
importance of empirically addressing both components of the Control Failure 
x Concerns view (McVay & Kane, 2010), to promote the development of 
theoretical explanation of the mind-wandering experience.   
Appendix A. Modified personal aspirations and concerns inventory 
The questionnaire was administered in German. The instruction read: 
“Thank you in advance for completing this questionnaire. Your information will be treated confidentially and analyzed in anonymized form. 
Instruction. A current concern is a topic that presently occupies you. Undoubtedly, you have concerns in different areas of your life. Probably you 
think about how to solve these concerns. A concern is not only understood as a problem. You could have concerns about unpleasant things which you 
would like to get rid of, prevent or avoid. Or you could have things that you'd like to obtain, preserve, or complete. Concerns are also thoughts that 
often come to your mind because you find them interesting or important. 
There are 9 life areas: (1) Home / Household, (2) Job / Occupation, (3) Education / Personal Development, (4) Leisure / Recreation, (5) 
Relationships, (6) Health, (7) Fitness / Sports, (8) Budget, and (9) Other. Please name concerns you feel you currently have in these areas and rate the 
importance of each concern to you. You can list as few or as many concerns per area as you feel you have. Please do not hesitate to contact the 
research assistant if you have any questions or comments.” Table A1 depicts an example question as presented in the questionnaire. 
Table A1 
Example Question from the Concerns Questionnaire Used in the Study. Each Question Provided Ten Response Rows.    
1) Do you have current concerns in the area Home / 
Household? 
If 0 = barely important, 5 = moderately important and 10 = highly important, how important is each concern to 
you?                          
(continued on next page) 
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Table A1 (continued)   
1) Do you have current concerns in the area Home / 
Household? 
If 0 = barely important, 5 = moderately important and 10 = highly important, how important is each concern to 
you?                   
Appendix B. SART reaction time analyses 
Here, we report descriptive statistics and BANOVAS for N = 56 (22 younger, 34 older adults). Due to a programming error, reaction times (RTs) 
were not recorded for 32 participants. The summarized RTs in milliseconds were MGoTrials = 296 (SDGoTrials = 15) and MNoGo = 273 (SDNoGo = 15) for 
younger adults, and MGoTrials = 332 (SDGoTrials = 25) and MNoGo = 331 (SDNoGo = 25) for older adults. The data are visualized in Panel A of Fig. B1. 
B.1. Analysis A 
We conducted a 2 (Age Group: Younger, Older) × 2 (Trial Type: Go, No-Go) BANOVA on mean RTs. Results are presented in Table B1, column A. 
There was largest support for the model with main effects and their interaction. However, the contribution of the interaction was not credible (BF in 
favor of keeping the interaction in the model = 1.46). Follow-up t-tests indicated that the interaction term was ambiguous due to the fact that older 
adults' RTs were similar across trial types (BF = 0.25), but younger adults' No-Go RTs were faster than their RTs on Go-trials (BF = 3.34). This 
indicates that younger adults' RTs were faster when they made a commission error (i.e., responded in no-go trials). 
Table B1 
Bayes Factors (BFs) for the 2 × 2 Bayesian ANOVAS on Reaction Time.        
Predictor (2) 
A B C D  
Predictors included in the mo-
del 
Trial Type (go, no- 
go) 
Outcome (Commission, Correct 
Rejection) 
Outcome (Commission, Correct 
Rejection) 
Outcome (Commission, Correct 
Rejection) 
(1) Age Group 5 × 105 574 1.20 1.48 
(2) See column 0.88 148 0.24 3.13 
(1) + (2) 4.86 × 105 8.37 × 104 0.31 4.79 
(1) + (2) + (1) × (2) 7.12 × 105 6.66 × 104 0.75 2.25 
Note. Predictor (2) is indicated above each column. (1) + (2) = model with both main effects, (1) + (2) + (1) × (2) = model with main effects and their 
interaction. Dependent variables in the analyses were: A = mean RT across conditions, B = mean RT 3 trials prior to a no-go target, C = RTCV on 3 trials prior to no- 
go target, D = RT one trial after a no-go target. The best model for each column is printed in bold. The BFs represent evidence for each model against the model with 
no fixed effects, and only a random effect of subjects.  
B.2. Analysis B 
Next, we analyzed RTs on the three trials preceding a no-go target as a function of the no-go outcome (correct rejection or commission error). The 
data were trimmed to include only no-go trials preceded by three consecutive go-trials, and 69% of the data survived the trimming procedure. The 
trimmed data was balanced between subjects, as all participants experienced the identical sequence of SART stimuli resulting in the exclusion of the 
same trials for everyone. Small variations in the number of observations resulted from the exclusion of observations with any omissions in the 
preceding three trials. 
The data are visualized in Panel B of Fig. B1 and summarized in Table B2. we conducted a 2 (Age Group: Younger, Older) × 2 (Outcome: 
Commission, Correct Rejection) BANOVA (see results in Table B1, column B). This revealed strongest support for a model with only the main effects 
of age group and outcome, indicating that (1) older adults' responses were slower overall, and (2) commission errors were preceded by faster mean 
RTs than correctly withheld responses in both age groups. 
Table B2 
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) for RTs (in Milliseconds) in the SART task.       
Variable Commission Correct 
Younger Older Younger Older  
Mean 3 trials before target 286 (15) 328 (20) 313 (15) 340 (20) 
RTCV 3 trials before target 0.28 (0.03) 0.30 (0.08) 0.24 (03) 0.34 (0.08) 
RT 1 trial post-target 291 (17) 302 (31) 298 (17) 323 (31)  
B.3. Analysis C 
The following analysis relates RT variability to no-go trial outcome. Variability was computed as coefficient of variation (RTCV), namely 
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SDGoTrials / MeanGoTrials on the three trials preceding a no-go target, using the trimmed data described in the previous analysis. Descriptive statistics 
are summarized in Table B2, and data are visualized in Panel C of Fig. B1. A 2 (Age Group: Younger, Older) × 2 (Outcome: Commission, Correct 
Rejection) BANOVA (see Table B1, column C) yielded low to no evidence for all models. 
B.4. Analysis D 
Lastly, we addressed post-error slowing. The data are summarized in Table B2 and visualized in Panel D of Fig. B1. A 2 (Age Group: Younger, 
Older) × 2 (Outcome: Commission, Correct Rejection) BANOVA on go-RTs one trial after a no-go target showed that the best model included the 
main effects of age group and outcome (see Table B1, column D). Parsing of the evidence in BF ratios revealed support for the factor Outcome (BF 
ratio = 3.22) but not Age Group (BF ratio = 1.52), indicating that post-error slowing was present for both younger and older adults. 
In summary, (1) older adults' RTs were slower than younger adults', and (2) commission responses were preceded by faster responses on go-trials. 
These findings replicate previous reports. In contrast, (3) RT variability did not predict no-go trial outcome, and (4) there was some evidence that 
RTs on one trial after a correct response were slower than ones after a commission error. 
Fig. B1. Visualization of the SART RT data. Error bars are the 95% within-subjects' confidence intervals. 
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Appendix C. Evaluation of differing task lengths on attention across age 
A possible challenge to our study is that each task used different numbers of trials and led to different overall task lengths. Furthermore, as older 
adults show slower reaction times in self-paced tasks such as visual WM (Duarte et al., 2013; Strunk, Morgan, Reaves, Verhaeghen, & Duarte, 2018) 
and reading (Jackson & Balota, 2012; Krawietz et al., 2012), their on-task time is bound to be longer. In contrast, the automatized SART pace used 
here ensured invariant task duration across groups. Critically, using 300 trials in the visual WM task added 30 min to the session length for older 
adults. One may wonder whether on-task duration impacted self-reported attention. 
C.1. Visual WM task 
To examine the effect of task length on attention, we divided the visual WM task in 6 subblocks and compared attention ratings as a function of 
block. The data are visualized in Fig. C1, Panel A. A 2 (Age Group: Younger, Older) × 6 (Block) BANOVA showed largest support for the model with 
main effects and their interaction (see Table C1). The evidence for including the interaction in the best model was BF = 15 (BFFull divided by 
BFMainEffects). However, it was not older adults' attention that dwindled: Follow-up t-tests of mean attention between the first and sixth blocks showed 
credible declines in younger adults' rated attention (BF10 = 1.68 × 10
12), but not in older adults' (BF10 = 0.48). For younger adults, mean attention 
declined by one rating point between the first and the last block (MBlock1 = 6.78, SD = 1.42, MBlock6 = 5.62, SD = 1.90). For older adults, this 
decrease was of only half a rating point (MBlock1 = 7.21, SD = 1.54, MBlock6 = 6.74, SD = 1.75). 
Table C1 
Bayes Factors (BFs) for the 2 × 2 Bayesian ANOVAS on Attention Ratings and Performance Lapses.        
Task 
Visual WM Reading  
Predictors included in the model Attention ratings Performance lapses Attention ratings Detection lapses 
(1) Age Group 2.46 49 116 6.49 
(2) Block 1.29 × 1011 4.76 × 1011 9.30 × 104 3.21 × 1020 
(1) + (2) 3.18 × 1011 2.10 × 1013 1.11 × 107 2.40 × 1021 
(1) + (2) + (1) × (2) 4.97 × 1012 4.55 × 1014 5.15 × 108 1.03 × 1023 
Note. Dependent variable is indicated above each column. (1) + (2) = model with both main effects, (1) + (2) + (1) × (2) = model with main effects and their 
interaction. The best model for each column is printed in bold. The BFs represent evidence for each model against the model with no fixed effects, and only a random 
effect of subjects.  
Next, we analyzed the relationship of time on-task and proportion of performance lapses (Fig. C1, Panel B). As in the main analysis, a lapse was 
defined as a trial with less than 2 correctly reported items. A 2 (Age Group: Younger, Older) × 6 (Block) BANOVA on proportion of lapses showed 
largest support for the model with the main effects and their interaction (see Table C1). Follow-up t-tests revealed that the interaction was due to 
older adults' performance improving towards the end of the task (BF10 = 2526) with less lapses in Block 6 (M = 0.16, SD = 0.17) than in Block 1 
(M = 0.39, SD = 0.24). For younger adults, there was ambiguous evidence for a difference in performance between Block 1 (M = 0.2, SD = 0.18) 
and Block 6 (M = 0.11, SD = 0.12), BF10 = 2.29. 
Next, we analyzed attention ratings in the reading task, similarly dividing the data into six blocks, and observed the same pattern. The data are 
visualized in Fig. C1, Panel C. A 2 (Age Group: Younger, Older) × 6 (Block) BANOVA showed that the full model was the best model, 
(BF10 = 5.15 × 10
8), and there was strong evidence for including the interaction term in this model (BF ratio = 46). WW WWithin-age group t-tests 
showed that whereas evidence for a change between the first and last block in the younger group was ambiguous (BF = 1.15), the evidence was 
against such a change for older adults (BF = 0.28), indicating stability of rated attention across the task's length. Thus, despite the longer durations, 
older adults actually upheld their attention for the whole session, indicating that greater task lengths were not a confound for the validity of the 
attentional reports between groups. 
Lastly, to test the relationship of performance and time on task, we analyzed the proportion of gibberish detection lapses with a 2 (Age Group: 
Younger, Older) × 6 (Block) BANOVA. The data are visualized in Fig. C1, Panel D. The results again supported the model with the main effects and 
their interaction (see Table C1), and BF in favor of the interaction was 42. Within-group t-tests showed mild evidence for a change from block one to 
six for younger adults in detection of gibberish (BF10 = 3.65) and evidence against a change for older adults (BF10 = 0.27). 
In summary, analyses of attention ratings as well as performance accuracy did not reveal disadvantages to older adults as a consequence of longer 
time on task. 
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Fig. C1. Visualization of mean attention ratings and performance lapses (y-axes) as a function of time on task (x-axis) in the visual WM (Panels A and B) and reading 
(Panels C and D) tasks. Error bars are the 95% within-subjects' confidence intervals. 
Appendix D. Visualization of commission errors and mean attention Ratings throughout the SART 
To complement the visualizations of task accuracy and mean attention ratings across time on task in Appendix C, Fig. D1 presents the same plots 
for the SART. 
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Fig. D1. Visualization of proportion commission errors and mean attention ratings (y-axes) as a function of time on task (x-axis) in the SART. Error bars are the 95% 
within-subjects' confidence intervals. 
Appendix E. Visualization of response frequencies in visual WM task 
Fig. E1. Number of observations for correctly reported memory items (Panel A) and attention ratings (Panel B) in the visual working memory task. Both panels 
visualize data from attention-probed trials only (i.e., the data reported in the main analysis). Note that younger adults were presented five and older adults four 
memory items. 
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Appendix F. Results of regression analyses on binned attention ratings in the Gibberish detection, reading LTM, and SART 
Attention ratings' distribution in the Reading task was skewed towards high responses (see Fig. F1), and binning into three categories led to 
convergence issues. We repeated the analyses with ratings binned into two categories (ratings 1–7: “low” and 8–9 “high”). First, we computed the 
trial-by-trial rstanarm model on gibberish detection lapses, including Age Group and Attention Ratings as binary predictors (priors: cauchy(loca-
tion = 0, scale = 5), R = 1.02, effective/total sample size ratio  >  0.13, number of effective samples > 542). As reported in Table F1, the results' 
pattern was identical to that of the main analysis: Higher attention ratings predicted fewer gibberish detection lapses, and older adults' gibberish 
detection performance was superior to that of younger adults'. Next, we modeled the LTM part of the Reading task (priors: cauchy(location = 0, 
scale = 5), R = 1.005, effective/total sample size ratio  >  0.08, number of effective samples > 327). Similar to the main analysis, the model 
revealed no credible effects of attention or age group on LTM accuracy (see Table F1). 
Last, we repeated the analysis of SART commissions. Attention ratings in the SART were skewed towards high responses (see Fig. F1, Panel C), 
and model with three categories did not converge. Hence, we binned ratings into low (1–7) and high (8–9). The model (priors: cauchy(location = 0, 
scale = 5), R = 1.001, effective/total sample size ratio  >  0.35, number of effective samples > 1068) showed that older adults had fewer com-
mission errors, but, contrary to the main analysis, the attention rating term was no longer credible (see Table F1). 
In summary, converting attention ratings from a continuous to a categorical predictor led to a more balanced distribution of observations 
between the factor levels, but the loss of variability resulted in reduction in explanatory power. 
Fig. F1. Number of observations for attention ratings on the gibberish detection (Panel A) and in the long-term memory (Panel B) trials in the reading task. Panel C 
depicts attention ratings after no-go trials in the SART. 
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Table F1 
Posterior Estimates of the Predictors of the Reading Task and SART, Attention Ratings binned to Low (1–7) and High (8–9).         
Parameters Gibberish detection LTM Accuracy SART commissions 
Mean 95% HDI Mean 95% HDI Mean 95% HDI  
Intercept −1.67 [−2.22, 1.19] 1.12 [0.88, 1.39] −0.15 [−0.56, 0.25] 
Attention −0.62 [−1.19, −0.01] −0.26 [−0.55, 0.01] −0.26 [−0.77, 0.24] 
Group −0.96 [−1.99, −0.009] −0.25 [−0.76, 0.24] −0.66 [−1.24, −0.08] 
Attention × Group 0.44 [−0.59, 1.50] −0.24 [−0.79, 0.33] −0.02 [−0.76, 0.71] 
Note. Parameter values are on the logit scale. Values in boldface indicate credible effects (i.e., the HDI does not include zero).  
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